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INTRODUCTION: THE GLOBALIZATION OF SECURITIES
REGULATION—COMPETITION OR COORDINATION?
Barbara Black *

I. INTRODUCTION
From the enactment of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act 1 in 2002 through
2008, influential voices in the political, business, and academic
communities expressed growing concern that the U.S. capital markets
were losing their competitive advantage. 2
While commentators
identified a number of factors as contributing to this decline, they
singled out, in particular, higher U.S. regulatory compliance costs and
liability risks. The U.S. Department of Treasury, under the leadership of
Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, spearheaded efforts to reexamine
regulatory structure and emphasized the competitive pressures that
foreign markets posed for the U.S. securities markets. 3 The Treasury’s
Blueprint for a Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure, released in
March 2008, warned that the “threat to U.S. competitiveness appears to
be real and growing” 4 and urged reforms “to protect the competitiveness
of the U.S. public capital markets.” 5
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), in turn, considered
a number of deregulatory proposals that would ease barriers to entry.
Thus, in 2008, the agency eliminated the requirement that foreign
private issuers selling securities in the U.S. restate their financial
statements, prepared under International Financial Reporting Standards
* Charles Hartsock Professor of Law and Director, Corporate Law Center, University of
Cincinnati College of Law. The Twenty Third Annual Symposium, Globalization of Securities Markets:
Competition or Coordination?, was held on March 5, 2010. This Introduction bears the date of October
10, 2010.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 7201 et seq. (2006).
2. See, e.g., COMM’N ON THE REGULATION OF U.S. CAPITAL MARKETS IN THE 21ST CENTURY,
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2007) (sponsored by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce); Kate Litvak,
The Effect of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act on Non U.S. Companies Cross-Listed in the U.S., 13 J. CORP. FIN.
196 (2007).
3. COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REG., INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL
MARKETS REGULATION 3–4 (2006) (the “Paulson Report”) (describing globalization of the capital
markets as a significant development and noting that foreign capital markets, unlike the U.S., often
benefit from more adaptive regulatory structures).
4. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGULATORY
STRUCTURE 1 (2008).
5. Id.
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(IFRS), to conform to U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
(GAAP). 6 The SEC also released a Roadmap that set forth a process
that would lead to the use of IFRS by domestic issuers in 2014. 7 It
launched a mutual recognition program that would exempt foreign stock
exchanges and foreign broker–dealers from SEC registration so long as
they complied with home-country regulations deemed compatible with
U.S. regulation. 8 The SEC also proposed a rule that would increase the
range of services foreign broker–dealers could offer in the U.S. without
registering with the agency. 9 While the rationale for these actions was
to increase market efficiency and liquidity and enhance investor
protection, 10 the SEC was likely influenced as well by the perception
that the U.S. capital markets no longer possessed their previous
dominance.
The global financial meltdown of 2008, however, changed the tenor
of the discussion and brought an increased awareness of the
interconnectedness of the markets, the need for more effective regulation
to deal with systemic risk, and the importance of a coordinated approach
toward securities regulation. 11 In contrast to the prior deregulatory
approach, the Obama Administration’s Financial Regulatory Reform
called for strengthening international cooperation to raise international
regulatory standards. 12
Its proposed reforms included improved
6. Acceptance from Foreign Private Issuers of Financial Statements Prepared in Accordance
with International Financial Reporting Standards Without Reconciliation to U.S. GAAP, Exchange Act
Release No. 57,026, 73 Fed. Reg. 986 (Jan. 4, 2008). These developments are analyzed in Steven M.
Davidoff, Rhetoric and Reality: A Historical Perspective on the Regulation of Foreign Private Issuers,
79 U. CIN. L. REV. 619 (2010).
7. Roadmap for the Potential Use of Financial Statements Prepared in Accordance with
International Financial Reporting Standards by U.S. Issuers, Exchange Act Release No. 58,960, 73 Fed.
Reg. 70,816 (Nov. 21, 2008). These developments are analyzed in William W. Bratton, Heedless
Globalism: The SEC’s Roadmap to Accounting Convergence, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 471 (2010).
8. See Ethiopis Tafara & Robert J. Peterson, A Blueprint for Cross-Border Access to U.S.
Investors: A New International Framework, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 31 (2007). These developments are
analyzed in Chris Brummer, Territoriality as a Regulatory Technique: Notes from the Financial Crisis,
79 U. CIN. L. REV. 499 (2010).
9. Exemption of Certain Foreign Broker or Dealers, Exchange Act Release No. 58,047, 73 Fed.
Reg. 39,182 (July 8, 2008).
10. See, e.g., Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement of the European Commission and
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on Mutual Recognition in Securities Markets, (Feb. 1,
2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-9.htm (stating that mutual recognition
“offers significant promise as a means of better protecting investors, fostering capital formation and
maintaining fair, orderly, and efficient transatlantic securities markets”).
11. See, e.g., Timothy F. Geithner, Sec’y of Treasury, Remarks at the Brookings Institution (Oct.
6, 2010) (describing the past two years as a “period of unprecedented international cooperation”).
12. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW FOUNDATION:
REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION 8 (2009) (noting that “[w]ithout consistent
supervision and regulation, financial institutions will tend to move their activities to jurisdictions with
looser standards, creating a race to the bottom and intensifying systemic risk for the entire global
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oversight of the global financial markets and the global financial firms
whose financial instability caused so much damage to the global
economy. 13
International organizations also came forth with revitalized regulatory
agendas that emphasized cooperation. For example, the Financial
Stability Forum, subsequently re-established as the Financial Stability
Board (FSB), 14 released principles for cross-border cooperation in crisis
management in recognition that “the growing interactions between
national financial systems require international cooperation by
authorities.” 15 The principles called for coordinated actions to prepare
for financial crises, including the sharing of information and
development of common support tools, 16 and internationally coordinated
solutions to manage financial crises. 17 In response to the G-20 Leaders’
call for a review, the Joint Forum, established in 1996 under the aegis of
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (the Basel Committee),
the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), and
the International Association of Insurance Supervisors to deal with
issues common to the banking, securities, and insurance sectors, released
a report that recommended improvements to strengthen financial
regulation 18 as part of a global effort to reform and strengthen financial
regulation. 19 The report emphasized the systemic risk posed by
financial groups that operate “through networks of legal entities and
structures” and that “are often active across multiple jurisdictions and
with multiple interdependencies.” 20 It also articulated as a guiding
principle that “[c]onsistent implementation of international standards is
critical to avoid competitive issues and regulatory arbitrage.” 21
This Symposium was held on March 5, 2010, while policy makers
and regulators were grappling with complex issues of reform and
restructure in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Congress was
financial system”).
13. Id. at 16–18, 80–88.
14. The re-establishment of the Financial Stability Forum as the Financial Stability Board, which
included expanding its membership, strengthening its institutional foundations, and enhancing its
mandate, is set forth in Robert B. Ahdieh, Imperfect Alternatives: Networks, Salience, and Institutional
Design in Financial Crisis, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 527 (2010).
15. FIN. STABILITY FORUM, FSF PRINCIPLES FOR CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION ON CRISIS
MANAGEMENT 2 (2009).
16. Id. at 2–3.
17. Id. at 3–4.
18. THE JOINT FORUM, REVIEW OF THE DIFFERENTIATED NATURE AND SCOPE OF FINANCIAL
REGULATION: KEY ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2010).
19. Id. at 1.
20. Id. at 3.
21. Id. at 4.
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debating the legislation that it subsequently enacted as the Dodd–Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd–Frank), 22 and
the Basel Committee had released a proposal to strengthen global capital
and liquidity requirements (Basel III). 23 How would these competing
forces—competition and coordination—play out in the debate? This
was the overarching question the panelists addressed in the Symposium
and in their articles.
II. THEMES FROM THE SYMPOSIUM
This collection of articles provides a rich and sophisticated
commentary on international financial regulation that reflects diverse
viewpoints, from which a number of intertwining themes emerge.
First, never underestimate the importance of politics in the debate
over regulatory reform. In his study of U.S. regulation of foreign
private issuers, 24 Professor Steven M. Davidoff demonstrates that the
administrative rulemaking process can be subject to the same political
vicissitudes as the legislative process. He provocatively argues that the
rhetoric of “mutual recognition” and “global competition” was used to
advance “a political economy and interest group story” for the benefit of
key business constituencies. 25 The result was deregulation in the name
of competitiveness, with reduced concern for protecting retail investors
and other domestic interests. As a consequence, regulation of foreign
private issuers is “one-size-fits-all” and fails to take into account the
different risk profiles presented by Chinese issuers compared with
European issuers. 26 This is significant because in the past year there
have been fourteen initial public offerings by foreign private issuers in
the U.S., eleven of them from mainland China, none of them from
Europe. 27
In his analysis of the contrasting approaches toward global
convergence in accounting standards, Professor William W. Bratton also
relates a narrative of interest group politics. 28 GAAP, he tells us, “has
come to be seen as one of the deadweight domestic regulatory costs that

22. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
23. Press Release, Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Consultative Proposals to Strengthen
the Resilience of the Banking Sector Announced by Basel Committee (Dec. 17, 2009), available at
http://www.bis.org/press/p091217.htm.
24. Davidoff, supra note 6.
25. Id. at 620.
26. Id. at 620, 645.
27. Id. at 643.
28. Bratton, supra note 7.
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make U.S. capital markets unattractive to foreign issuers.” 29 In 2008 the
SEC, in what Professor Bratton describes as a “global panic attack,” 30
issued its Roadmap that sets forth a process that would lead to
discarding GAAP for the use of IFRS by domestic issuers. The SEC
thus demonstrated its impatience with the slower, ongoing convergence
project of the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) to develop
compatible standards. Professor Bratton first highlights some normative
implications of a switch to IFRS and then develops the argument for the
importance of an independent standard-setter. Specifically, he argues
that a switch to IFRS would give the preparers of financial statements
(managers and auditors) the upper hand over the users of financial
statements. 31 FASB achieved public accountability and funding only
after many years of hard work and only with SEC support; the IASB, in
contrast, is dependent on private funding, principally from auditing
firms, and has only recently set up a monitoring board. 32 Professor
Bratton argues that the financial crisis has changed the debate and that
the Roadmap should be scrapped so that the more deliberative process of
convergence can move forward. 33
Currently, the SEC is still scheduled to decide in 2011 whether IFRS
would become exclusive, although SEC Chair Mary Schapiro has stated
that the convergence projects currently underway between FASB and
IASD must be completed before the decision can be made. 34 The
Chairman of the IFRS Advisory Council, however, recently stated that
convergence with the FASB would no longer be its prime consideration
and that it would instead focus on serving those who have adopted
IFRS. 35
Second, never underestimate the power of global financial
conglomerates. Professor James A. Fanto explores whether the
dismantling of global financial conglomerates may be warranted because
of the economic and political threats they represent. 36 From fall 2008

29. Id. at 491.
30. Id. at 497.
31. Id. at 474.
32. Id. at 486.
33. Id. at 496.
34. Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech by SEC Chairman: Statement
at SEC Open Meeting – Global Accounting Standards (Feb. 24, 2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch022410mls-accounting.htm.
35. Denise Lugo, Accounting Principles: IFRS Chairman Says FASB Convergence Not Future
Priority, May Approach Others, Sec. L. Daily (BNA), Oct. 6, 2010.
36. James A. Fanto, “Breaking Up is Hard To Do”: Should Financial Conglomerates Be
Dismantled?, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 553 (2010).
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until mid-2009, the consistent approach of both the Bush and Obama
Administrations was to stabilize financial conglomerates, rework their
capital support, and oversee their rehabilitation. 37 As a result, the
surviving conglomerates returned to profitability, executive
compensation increased, and there was greater industry concentration. 38
In its second year, however, the Obama Administration put forth several
proposals for breaking up conglomerates, including a tax aimed at large
investment banking-dominated conglomerates, the “Volcker Rule” that
would prohibit conglomerates from sponsoring hedge funds and
engaging in proprietary trading, and size limits on regulated financial
conglomerates. 39 Professor Fanto first sets forth the problems caused by
financial conglomerates during the financial crisis, often arising from
their securities activities: systemic risk, risk management,
commoditization and opaqueness of financial products, compensation
policies, conflicts of interest, and government support and politics.
After reviewing the arguments for and against break-up as well as
alternative approaches, he concludes that while many of the problems
presented by financial conglomerates argue for their break-up, strong
political pressures and the orientation of international financial
regulation mean that in all likelihood “conglomerates will endure,” even
though they cannot be effectively risk-managed. 40
Indeed, although Congress proclaimed that Dodd–Frank put an end to
“too big to fail,” 41 in fact the legislation contemplates modest limitations
on the size and riskiness of the global financial conglomerates. The
newly established Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) can
identify “systemically important” companies and recommend heightened
prudential standards, 42 and systemically important companies will be
subject to systemic regulation and other fees that might serve as a
disincentive to large size. 43 The “Volcker Rule” restricts banks from
proprietary trading and limits private equity and hedge fund investments
to three per cent of tier 1 capital, phased in over several years.44 Finally,
the Federal Reserve (Fed) can, if it finds that a firm presents a “grave
37. Id. at 558–59.
38. Id. at 559.
39. Id. at 560–63.
40. Id. at 585.
41. U.S. SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, & URBAN AFFAIRS, BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE
DODD–FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 1 (2010), available at
http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/070110_Dodd_Frank_Wall_Street_Reform_comprehensive_sum
mary_Final.pdf.
42. Dodd–Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 115, 165, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
43. §§ 155(d), 318(c).
44. § 619.
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threat to the financial stability of the United States,” require it to divest
assets and activities. 45 In addition, the Basel III standards impose
stricter standards for capital, leverage, and liquidity.46 To date,
however, the government’s emphasis on preventing “too big to fail” is
not on reducing the size of firms. Instead, regulators assert that, under
the new regulatory system, firms will have to manage better their risk,
and regulators will provide more effective supervision. Furthermore, in
the event of firm failure, regulators point to the provisions on orderly
liquidation 47 to contain the effects. Thus, Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke
identified a three-part strategy to address “too big to fail”: (1) reduce
excessive risk-taking; (2) implement orderly liquidation; and (3)
increase resiliency of financial system. 48 Yet the solution of an orderly
liquidation process for global financial conglomerates is untested, and
many doubt whether it will work to prevent future financial crises. 49
Third, while regulators espouse the importance of cooperation and
coordination, much work needs to be done to overcome territoriality and
competition. Professor Chris Brummer provides a framework for
viewing the role of national regulators as sources of international finance
law. 50
In particular, Professor Brummer examines the use of
extraterritoriality as a regulatory strategy. He argues that “territorial”
authority in financial regulation “in practice constitutes a diverse array
of tactics employed by national authorities to exert authority over mobile
market participants.” 51 Because globalization limits the effectiveness of
territoriality as a regulatory technique, regulators increasingly emphasize
the “softer” process of international cooperative efforts in information
sharing and development of norms. 52 He concludes, nonetheless, that
territoriality remains a central element in international coordination,
45. § 121. See Posting of Simon Johnson to The Baseline Scenario, http://baselinescenario.com/
2010/07/09/the-kanjorski-surprise-%e2%80%93-now-it-gets-interesting/ (July 9, 2010, 6:06 AM)
(suggesting it could have a meaningful impact on banking industry).
46. Press Release, Bank for Int’l Settlements, Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision
Announces Higher Global Minimum Capital Standards (Sept. 12, 2010), available at
http://www.bis.org/press/p100912.htm.
47. Dodd–Frank Act §§ 201–217.
48. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Statement before the
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (Sept. 2, 2010). See also Sheila C. Bair, Chairman, Fed. Deposit
Ins. Corp., Statement before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (Sept. 3, 2010) (in the event firms
do not manage risks better, orderly liquidation will contain the problem).
49. See, e.g., James H.M. Sprayregen & Stephen E. Hessler, “Orderly Liquidation Authority”
under the Dodd–Frank Act. INSOL WORLD, 3rd Quart. 2010, at 23, available at
http://www.kirkland.com/siteFiles/Publications/ARTICLES%20-%20PRINTING%20ALLOWED%20%20INSOL%20World%20-%20Sprayregen_Hessler.pdf.
50. Brummer,supra note 8.
51. Id. at 501.
52. Id. at 524.
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even though unilateral, territorially-based regulatory export has become
increasingly difficult. 53
Professor Robert B. Ahdieh and Andrea M. Corcoran, in turn, present
complementary approaches to the importance of cooperation and
information-sharing to prevent or remediate financial crises and address
the limitations on effective cross-border regulation. Professor Ahdieh
focuses on the choice of institutional design as he explores what
regulatory structures and institutions are likely to be the most effective
in preventing and alleviating financial crises. 54 He first sets forth an
account of financial crises as grounded in the multiple equilibrium
character of the financial markets and develops a framework of the
critical determinants of salience—familiarity, visibility, uniqueness, and
authority—that institutions should possess in order to coordinate market
participants around the high-level equilibrium of lending, investment,
and spending. He next explores the role of transnational regulatory
networks in the financial crisis and explains that constraints on
institutional salience resulted in the networks’ limited role in the crisis. 55
Finally, he focuses on the restructuring of the FSB to illustrate certain
inherent limits of networks and to suggest institutional reforms that
might improve their effectiveness in financial crises.
Andrea Corcoran examines the proposal by the FSB to require
biennial peer reviews of the G-20 countries using existing key standards
and codes in order to address a key issue: whether enforcement of
existing global standards for capital markets, particularly those related to
cooperative information exchange, can be expected to prevent or remedy
a future financial crisis. 56 She first examines the limitations in the
existing IOSCO Standards, particularly gaps in addressing prudential
risks and other systemic vulnerabilities and gaps in information sharing.
Cooperative information-sharing, she points out, may not be
forthcoming where insufficient funds are available to satisfy all
claims. 57 In addition, the standards do not adequately address the canon
of country specificity and the problem of regulatory arbitrage. 58 She
then sets forth a number of proposed reforms in terms of both substance
and procedure, while noting the inherent limits on information sharing

53. Id.
54. Ahdieh, supra note 14.
55. Id. at 546.
56. Andrea M. Corcoran, Globalization Report Cards for Securities Regulators: National
Enforcement of International Capital Market Standards for Information Sharing and Cooperation and
the Prevention of Financial Crises, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 651 (2010).
57. Id. at 664.
58. Id. at 666–68.
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and cooperation.
Fourth, harmonization and centralization are worthy goals to strive
for, even if far off. Dodd–Frank underscores the importance of
international policy coordination. The statute authorizes the President to
coordinate through international policy channels policies to limit the
“scope, nature, size, scale, concentration, and interconnectedness” of
financial conglomerates. 59 It also mandates the FSOC to consult with its
counterparts and international organizations on “matters relating to
systemic risk to the international financial system” 60 and the Federal
Reserve Board to consult with its counterparts and appropriate
multilateral organizations “to encourage comprehensive and robust
prudential supervision and regulation for all highly leveraged and
interconnected financial companies.” 61 Nevertheless, the current system
of international securities regulation is essentially based on a model of
regulatory competition as nations attempt to attract issuers, investors,
and other market participants to their shores. Professor Eric C. Chaffee
argues that the current system fostered a “race-to-the-bottom” that
culminated in the lax regulation at the heart of the financial crisis. 62
Professor Chaffee articulates a bold alternative vision—a centralized
global securities regulator with monitoring, regulating, and enforcement
powers that would set a baseline of regulation from which nations could
choose to depart upwardly. Professor Chaffee argues that this model
would minimize systemic risks, benefit market participants, and allow
the U.S. to retain a central role. 63 He then outlines an evolutionary
process through two case studies of long-term evolutionary institution
building, the development of securities regulation in the U.S., and the
development of securities regulation in the European Union. The
common characteristics of the two case studies, he argues, “include
evolution based on political stress, evolution based on the failure of
institutions to achieve their intended goals, and a consistent trajectory
toward harmonization and centralization.” 64
III. CONCLUSION
In the post-financial crisis era, there is consensus that the

59. Dodd–Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 175(a), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
60. § 175(b).
61. § 175(c).
62. Eric C. Chaffee, Contemplating the Endgame: An Evolutionary Model for the Harmonization
and Centralization of International Securities Regulation, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 587, 588 (2010).
63. Id. at 601.
64. Id. at 612–13.
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interconnectedness of financial markets requires a global approach to
securities regulation. Expressions about the importance of cooperation
and coordination, however, mask strong underlying sentiments based on
politics and territorial competition. The hard work is ahead, as
policymakers and regulators move from the abstract to the concrete. It
remains very much to be seen how these countervailing forces will play
out in the implementation of Dodd–Frank and international regulatory
efforts. Stay tuned for the 2012 Symposium, which will address the
implementation of Dodd–Frank.
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